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Abstract
Consumers regularly have to choose between a pay-per-use and a flat-rate option. 
Due to the increasing number and range of (digital) services, the frequency at which 
consumers have to make tariff-choice decisions to use these services has become 
even more prevalent. Prior work has demonstrated that consumers’ tariff choices 
are often systematically biased and identified overconfidence as one of the key driv-
ers. Yet, prior research is non-experimental and focused on the so-called flat-rate 
bias. By contrast, we examine the effects of overconfidence on the choice between 
a pay-per-use and a flat-rate option using an experimental approach. We develop 
an incentive-compatible experiment to provide causal evidence for the effect of 
overconfidence on tariff-choice decisions. We find that overconfident (underconfi-
dent) consumers underestimate (overestimate) their actual usage, which leads them 
to choose a pay-per-use (flat-rate) option relatively more frequently. Based on the 
results, we discuss theoretical and managerial implications as well as avenues for 
future research.
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1 Introduction
Consumers regularly face the decision between a pay-per-use and a flat-rate option. 
Owing to the increasing number and range of (digital) services, the frequency at 
which consumers have to make such tariff-choice decisions to use these services has 
also become more prevalent. For example, cloud services (e.g., computing power 
or storage) and various apps (e.g., for sports, media, meditation) involve the choice 
between a pay-per-use and a flat-rate subscription. Even ride sharing services like 
Uber or Lyft that started with pay-per-use pricing only, now offer monthly flat-rates 
for reduced-cost rides (Hempel 2018; Matousek 2018). Consequently, even small 
mistakes in individual tariff choices may add up to a substantial overall financial loss 
across all service categories. As choosing the wrong tariff can result in consumers’ 
dissatisfaction and eventually churn (e.g., Lambrecht and Skiera 2006), better under-
standing consumers’ (potentially non-optimal) tariff choices is important for both 
consumers and service providers.
Prior research has widely documented that consumers do not always make opti-
mal (i.e., cost-minimizing) tariff-choice decisions (e.g., DellaVigna and Malmendier 
2006; Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). Such non-optimal choices can be driven either 
(1) by behavioral biases1 or (2) by consumers having a tariff-specific preference 
for the more expensive tariff. With respect to (1), belief-based biases are a leading 
candidate in the context of tariff-choice decisions. Belief-based biases arise when 
uncertainty factors into decisions. Under uncertainty, decision-makers must form 
beliefs regarding potential outcomes or “states of the world” (DellaVigna 2009; 
Rabin 2002). In tariff-choice decisions, consumers are faced with demand uncer-
tainty at the tariff-choice stage, because of a time lag between the tariff-choice deci-
sion and later usage decisions (Nunes 2000). For example, when consumers want to 
sign up for a gym membership, they have to choose the tariff first, but decide only 
later on the individual trips to the gym. Therefore, it is likely that belief-based biases 
influence consumers’ usage estimations and further their tariff-choice decisions. In 
particular, prior research proposed overconfidence as one of the main drivers of tar-
iff choice (e.g., DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006; Grubb 2009). These studies typi-
cally infer overconfidence from comparing contract choices to later usage by analyz-
ing observational or survey data. Yet, causal evidence is lacking.
The goal of this paper is to examine the effect of overconfidence on tariff-choice 
decisions. To this end, we develop an incentive-compatible online experiment. The 
participants are randomly assigned to one of two treatments. We follow established 
procedures in the literature (Dargnies et  al. 2019) to first induce overconfidence 
(over treatment) or underconfidence (under treatment) in our participants. Using a 
memory game, we then model the essential parts of real-world tariff choices, includ-
ing the prediction of usage, the choice of a tariff, and finally the usage/consumption 
of the product, to examine the effects of overconfidence/underconfidence on par-
ticipants’ choice between a pay-per-use and a flat-rate option.
1 For a review of behavioral biases in marketing see Dowling et al. (2020).
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Our contribution is a novel, incentive-compatible experimental paradigm and the 
causal evidence that our experimental approach provides. We show that overcon-
fidence (underconfidence) leads to an underestimation (overestimation) of actual 
usage, and thereby to a relatively higher pay-per-use (flat-rate) choice. This causal 
evidence is crucial for the theoretical and managerial implications as well as ave-
nues for future research that we discuss based on our findings.
2  Literature review
One can distinguish two broad streams of literature in tariff research. One stream of 
literature analyzes drivers of tariff choice (e.g., DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006; 
Uhrich et al. 2013). The other stream of literature studies consumer behavior given 
a chosen tariff (e.g., Iyengar et al. 2011; Leider and Şahin 2014). Focusing on tariff 
choice, several studies showed that consumers do not always select the tariff that 
minimizes their billing rate (e.g., DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006; Lambrecht 
and Skiera 2006; Train et al. 1987; Uhrich et al. 2013). The majority of these stud-
ies finds mostly flat-rate choices and documents a flat-rate bias2 (DellaVigna and 
Malmendier 2006; Lambrecht and Skiera 2006; Uhrich et  al. 2013; Herweg and 
Mierendorff 2013). DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), for example, found that 
consumers chose the flat-rate tariff too often in a gym setting, and Lambrecht and 
Skiera (2006) showed that consumers primarily had a flat-rate bias in the context of 
internet access. A few studies also analyzed the pay-per-use choice and pay-per-use 
bias (e.g., Lambrecht and Skiera 2006; Miravete 2002). For instance, Lambrecht and 
Skiera (2006) demonstrate that the pay-per-use bias (in contrast to the flat-rate bias) 
only occurs irregularly and that it seems to lead to higher churn. For both tariffs, 
most studies identify drivers of tariff choice based on findings from observational or 
survey data.
Two explanations for non-optimal tariff-choice decisions have been proposed. 
First, consumers are inherently prone to biases (nonstandard preferences, nonstand-
ard beliefs, and nonstandard decision-making; see DellaVigna 2009), leading them 
to commit errors. Regarding nonstandard preferences, DellaVigna and Malmendier 
(2006), for example, suggest that time-inconsistent preferences can induce a flat-rate 
bias. Concerning nonstandard beliefs, consumers are likely to form incorrect beliefs 
about their future usage (Nunes 2000), resulting in misforecasting and non-optimal 
tariff-choice decisions or the overestimation of their abilities to navigate contract 
terms (Grubb 2015b). Finally, framing effects (as an example of nonstandard deci-
sion-making) may systematically influence consumers’ tariff choices. Equivalent but 
2 Note that both flat-rate “bias” and pay-per-use “bias” do not refer to behavioral biases in the sense of 
deviations from the standard economic model, but rather deviations from the optimal (i.e., cost-minimiz-
ing) tariff choice.
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differently framed decision problems may cause individuals to shift or reverse their 
preferences and elicit different behavioral reactions.
The second explanation is that consumers have a preference3 for a respective tariff 
and deliberately choose the more expensive tariff. Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) ana-
lyze causes of such tariff-specific preferences. They demonstrate that the so-called 
insurance effect (i.e., aversion to variations in monthly bill amounts) and taxi-meter 
effect (i.e., when the ticking taxi meter lowers the consumption enjoyment) lead to a 
flat-rate bias. Uhrich et al. (2013) replicate these findings and show that consumers 
with a more hedonic consumption goal exhibit a stronger preference for the flat-
rate, whereas consumers with a more utilitarian consumption goal exhibit a stronger 
preference for the pay-per-use plan. Their study also implies that the context (i.e., 
hedonic vs. utilitarian setting) influences whether a greater choice of the flat-rate or 
the pay-per-use plan can be expected.
Both explanations can drive tariff-choice decisions, they are, however, not mutu-
ally exclusive, but may also interact. Assume, for example, a consumer prefers a 
flat-rate over a pay-per-use tariff due to the taxi-meter effect. Given this preference, 
consumers may form biased beliefs about their estimated usage (i.e., too high) to 
justify their preference and resulting choice to avoid cognitive dissonance.
This paper is primarily concerned with the first explanation for non-optimal 
tariff-choice decisions, in particular with belief-based biases. Belief-based biases 
emerge in the presence of uncertain factors in decision-making. Under uncertainty, 
decision-makers must form beliefs regarding potential outcomes or “states of the 
world”. To illustrate this more formally, consider the following version of the stand-
ard economic model, formulated by Rabin (2002) and then modified by DellaVigna 
(2009):
In this formulation, individual i maximizes expected utility at time t = 0, subject 
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Regarding possible belief-based biases influencing tariff choice, previous research 
proposed overconfidence as a key driver (e.g., DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006; 
Grubb and Osborne 2015; Grubb 2015a). The empirical literature defines overcon-
fidence in three distinct ways (Moore and Healy 2008). The first facet of overconfi-
dence is overestimation, which is defined by overestimating one’s actual ability, per-
formance, level of control, or chance of success. The second facet of overconfidence 
is overprecision, which is the excessive certainty regarding the accuracy of one’s 
beliefs. The third facet of overconfidence is overplacement, which occurs when peo-
ple consider their abilities to be better than average.
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), for example, propose that overconfidence 
about future self-control is a main driver of the substantial flat-rate bias they 
observe. Grubb and Osborne (2015) argue that consumers are overconfident in the 
sense that they underestimate the variance of their future consumption and thereby 
choose overly risky plans (in the context of a cellular service). Grubb (2015a) fur-
ther suggests that naive inattention may explain the presence of overconfidence that 
Grubb and Osborne (2015) estimate. He shows that overconfidence leads naively 
inattentive customers to underestimate the probability of paying surprise penalty 
fees.
Importantly, whether overconfidence leads to overestimation or underestimation 
(of usage) seems to depend on the underlying setting. Overestimation appears to 
occur when a higher usage is desirable (e.g., gym setting), whereas underestimation 
appears to occur when a lower usage/cost is desirable (e.g., cellular service). Over-
all, overconfidence has been proposed as a key driver of tariff choice across multiple 
industries (e.g., gym memberships, internet access, or optional calling plans) and 
methods (observational data: e.g., DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006 or analytical 
modeling: e.g., Grubb 2015a). However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has 
yet experimentally studied the effect of overconfidence on tariff choice. Yet, identi-
fying causal relationships is crucial for deriving effective managerial implications. 
Managers aiming to reduce potential adverse effects of overconfidence should only 
invest in such measures if a causal relationship exists to avoid ineffective invest-
ments. For example, Grubb and Osborne (2015) analyze the effectiveness of alerts 







Fig. 1  Predictions
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only effective if consumers are overconfident. Otherwise, alerts would have no effect 
and managers would have wasted resources.
In this research, we propose that overconfident consumers underestimate their 
actual usage, similar to the argument by Grubb and Osborne (2015), who suggest 
that overconfident consumers underestimate the variance of their future consump-
tion. Next, having underestimated their usage, we predict that overconfident con-
sumers are more likely to choose a pay-per-use (vs. a flat-rate) option. We expect the 
opposite effect for underconfident consumers. We illustrate our prediction in Fig. 1.
3  Method
3.1  Participants
We recruited 4114 US-based participants (48.91% female,  Mage = 38.07  years, 
SD = 11.31  years) from an online crowdsourcing platform for human intelligence 
tasks (HITs)—Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants completed the 
experiment through the web-based survey software Qualtrics in exchange for a fixed 
fee and an additional bonus payment that depended on participants’ behavior in the 
experiment.5 On average, participants completed the experiment in about 10 min.6
3.2  Design and procedure
The study consisted of three parts (see Fig. 2): the treatment phase (manipulation of 
overconfidence), a second part including estimation of usage, tariff choice, and com-
pletion of a usage task, and a third part consisting of process and belief measures.
We conducted an incentive-compatible experiment using a between-subjects 
design. In the treatment phase, we randomly assigned participants to one of two 
treatments: underconfidence and overconfidence. To manipulate overconfidence, 
we built on the “hard-easy effect” (Lichtenstein et al. 1982). More specifically, we 
followed the approach of Dargnies et  al. (2019). They used two different tasks to 
exogenously manipulate the self-confidence of their study participants. In that study, 
5 The fixed fee was $1.00. Participants that chose the pay-per-use option received an average bonus pay-
ment of $0.93, with a minimum of $0 and a maximum of $1.40.
6 In a pilot study, we observed that participants in the under treatment needed more time to answer the 
questions than the participants in the over treatment. Therefore, we increased the number of questions in 
the over treatment to achieve approximately the same average duration of the treatment phase.
4 We used comprehension questions to screen participants for participation in the key experimental task. 
Of the 443 participants that accessed our study through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), only 32 (7%) 
repeatedly failed to answer the comprehension questions correctly and therefore were not admitted to 
the main study. The 32 respondents excluded from participation split up almost equally between the two 
treatments (15 in the under treatment, 17 in the over treatment). Only 5.7% (27/(443 + 27)) of partici-
pants started but did not finish the experiment (most not proceeding beyond the starting page). There is a 
slight difference in dropouts between treatments (20 in the under treatment, 7 in the over treatment).The 
following results are based on the 411 participants who passed the comprehension questions and finished 
the experiment.
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the goal was to shift participants’ beliefs about their performance and then to test 
how this shift influences market outcomes.
In our treatments, participants had to complete a real-effort task. In the under 
treatment, participants had to solve 6 logic questions taken from IQ tests (see 
“Appendix”, Table 3). This task was difficult for participants as there was no clear 
technique that could be applied to answer the questions and we expected them to 
answer only a small number of the questions correctly (Dargnies et al. 2019). In the 
overconfidence treatment, participants had to solve 12 easy additions (see “Appen-
dix”, Table 3). This task was easy for participants because they were familiar with 
the task and we expected them to answer a large number of the questions correctly 
(Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Dargnies et al. 2019).7 We presented the questions 
sequentially. Participants received feedback on whether they had answered a ques-
tion correctly or not after each question. The aim of this manipulation was to induce 
relative underconfidence in the under treatment with the difficult task and relative 
overconfidence in the over treatment with the easy task (Dargnies et al. 2019; Cain 
et  al. 2015; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). After they completed the real-effort 
tasks, we asked participants to state what percentage of other participants they 
thought answered more questions correctly than they did (i.e., a better-than-average 
measure; Alicke and Govorun 2005).
In the second part of the study, we asked participants to estimate their usage in a 
usage task, to choose between a flat-rate and a pay-per-use option for this task, and 
then to complete the task (see Fig.  2). These three steps were designed to reflect 
the real-world situation of tariff-choice decisions including the prediction of usage, 












Completion of Usage Task
(Memory Game)
Process and Belief Measures
Satisfaction with tariff choice
Attitude towards risk 
Tariff-specific “preferences”
Demographics
Fig. 2  Overview of the three parts of the study
7 Participants could have used calculators to solve the addition tasks in the over treatment. However, 
using a calculator is not a problem, as this would have made the task even easier and possibly increased 
the induced overconfidence, in contrast to the under treatment, in which no tool would have made the 
task easier.
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operationalized the usage task as a memory game due to its resemblance to tariff-
choice decisions.
The memory game as our usage task enabled us to mirror the sequence of steps in 
tariff-choice decisions: estimation—choice—task completion. Moreover, our mem-
ory game had the advantage that participants most likely already had some experi-
ence with the game. Therefore, they could approximate how many clicks they might 
need, yet a moderate level of uncertainty about their estimated usage remained—as 
one would expect in a real-world tariff-choice situation. Another advantage of the 
memory game is that it is applicable to computation scenarios that require judgment. 
Therefore, the memory game is well suited for service contexts in which consum-
ers have to make judgments about consumption and cost. In this regard, the task is 
similar to other judgment tasks such as the “dot-guessing game” (Horton 2010) and 
the “ball-catching task” (Gächter et  al. 2016). Finally, the memory game requires 
participants to use their cognitive abilities, which has been shown to be an important 
aspect in situations involving usage estimation (see e.g., Nunes 2000).
Our usage task aimed to mimic a rather utilitarian (vs. hedonic) tariff-choice sit-
uation. Whereas in a hedonic context consumers should typically strive for maxi-
mizing their usage (e.g., gym setting), we should expect consumers in a utilitarian 
context to try to minimize their usage and corresponding cost (e.g., public transpor-
tation). Because each unit of “usage” in the memory game is costly under the pay-
per-use option, we expected participants to strive to minimize “usage” and thereby 
total cost.
We showed participants the memory game consisting of 16 tiles with food icons, 
as depicted in Fig. 5 in the “Appendix”. Moreover, we told them that participants 
needed on average 32 clicks to solve the memory game, which we learned in a pilot 
study (N = 45). Thereafter, we asked participants to state their estimate of how many 
clicks they thought they would need to solve the memory game and to state their 
confidence with regard to this estimate.8 Next, participants were presented with 
the choice between a flat-rate option and a pay-per-use option (called pay-per-click 
option in the experiment). To make the choice consequential for participants, they 
received a bonus payment depending on their chosen option. Under the flat-rate 
option, participants received a fixed bonus of $0.80, regardless of the number of 
clicks they needed to solve the memory game. Under the pay-per-use option, par-
ticipants received a bonus between $0 and $1.60, depending on the number of clicks 
they needed to solve the memory game (a cost per click of $0.05 was subtracted 
from $2.40; see Fig. 6 in the “Appendix”). We used the average of 32 clicks from the 
pilot study to parameterize the two tariff options such that the expected value of the 
bonus was the same for the two options ($0.80). Next, participants proceeded to the 
actual tariff choice and then completed the memory game. Upon completion of the 
8 We explicitly told participants what the task entailed and illustrated this with a graphical depiction. In 
addition, we told participants explicitly and truthfully how many clicks participants needed on average to 
complete the task (from the pilot study). It is therefore unlikely that participants had biased beliefs about 
the difficulty of the memory task.
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memory game, we told participants how many clicks they actually needed to solve it 
and what their bonus payment and total payout was.
In the last part of the study, we asked participants to answer process and belief 
measures. These measures included questions and scales regarding satisfac-
tion with their chosen tariff, attitude towards risk, tariff-specific preferences, and 
demographics.
3.3  Measures
This section summarizes all measures we elicited throughout the study. After the 
manipulation of overconfidence, we asked participants to answer two manipulation 
checks. We asked them to rate the perceived task difficulty (7-point scale; 1 = “not 
difficult at all” – 7 = “very difficult”) and to indicate the percentage of other partici-
pants that they believed had answered more questions correctly then they had (i.e., 
the better-than-average measure; 0–100%9; Alicke and Govorun 2005). After illus-
trating and explaining the memory game, we asked participants to estimate the num-
ber of clicks they would need to solve the memory game and to rate their confidence 
with regard to this estimation (7-point scale; 1 = “not confident at all” – 7 = “very 
confident”). Apart from the absolute number of estimated clicks, we also calculated 
an overestimation measure (= estimated clicks – actual clicks; Cain et  al. 2015). 
Next, participants made their choice between the two tariff options (0 = pay-per-
use; 1 = flat-rate). After their choice, we asked participants to rate their satisfaction 
with the chosen tariff (7-point scale; 1 = “not satisfied at all” – 7 = “very satisfied”; 
Novemsky and Schweitzer 2004). In the last part of the study, we asked participants 
to rate their willingness to take risks (7-point scale; 1 = “completely unwilling to 
take risks” – 7 = “completely willing to take risks”; Dohmen et al. 2011), to com-
plete Lambrecht and Skiera’s (2006) scales regarding tariff-specific preferences 
– insurance, taxi meter, and convenience effects – (for all constructs: 7-point scale; 1 
= “strongly disagree” – 7 = “strongly agree”), and to provide demographic informa-
tion: age, sex (0 = female; 1 = male), income, and employment status. We provide a 
detailed overview of all measures in Table 4 in the “Appendix”.
4  Results
Manipulation checks We conducted Mann–Whitney-U tests for task difficulty and 
the better-than-average measure, as these variables were not normally distributed. 
In terms of task difficulty, the results confirmed that participants in the under treat-
ment perceived their questions to be more difficult than the participants in the over 
treatment  (Munder = 6.46,  Mover = 1.45,  zMann–Whitney-U = 17.94, p < .001). Comparing 
the better-than-average measure between treatments showed that participants in the 
under treatment were more underconfident and participants in the over treatment 
9 We calculate the better-than-average measure as (50 – answer)/50, following Glaser and Weber (2007).
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more overconfident  (Munder = –.22,  Mover = .39,  zMann–Whitney-U = − 8.07, p < .001). 
Regarding task performance, as expected, the majority of participants in the under 
treatment only answered very few questions correctly (mostly 0-1 out of 6). Yet, par-
ticipants in the over treatment answered the majority of questions correctly (mostly 
11–12 out of 12).
Estimated and actual number of clicks We found that overconfident partici-
pants underestimated their actual usage, whereas underconfident consumers over-
estimated their actual usage (see Table  1). Mann-Whitney-U tests showed that 
the estimated number of clicks was significantly different between treatments 
 (Munder = 33.65,  Mover = 30.91,  zMann–Whitney-U = 3.44, p < .001). We found no sta-
tistically significant difference in the actual number of clicks, but the overestima-
tion measure was again significantly different between treatments  (Munder = 2.66, 
 Mover = − 1.25,  zMann–Whitney-U = 2.80, p < .005).
Choice Overall, 39.66% of participants chose the flat-rate option and 60.34% 
chose the pay-per-use option. In absolute terms, the majority of participants chose 
the pay-per-use option in both treatment groups, as evidenced by Fig. 3. However, 
there are significant relative differences between treatments. We found that par-
ticipants in the over treatment chose the pay-per-use (vs. the flat-rate) option rela-
tively more often than participants in the under treatment  (Munder = .55,  Mover = .65, 
 zMann–Whitney-U = − 2.07, p = .038). Participants in the under treatment in turn chose 
the flat-rate (vs. the pay-per-use) option relatively more often than participants in the 
over treatment.
Table 1  Estimated and actual number of clicks




Overestimation measure (3) 
= (1)–(2)
Under 201 33.65 30.99 2.66
Over 210 30.91 32.16 − 1.25
Fig. 3  Choice of flat-rate and pay-per-use option by treatment
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In addition, we analyzed the consistency of participants’ tariff choices. We com-
pared whether the chosen tariff was coherent with their stated estimates of clicks. 
More specifically, if participants estimated that they needed less than 32 clicks, they 
should have taken the pay-per-use option to maximize their payout, yet if they had 
estimated that they needed more than 32 clicks, they should have taken the flat-rate 
option. However, we found that 27% of participants did not choose the tariff option 
that would have matched their estimate. Broken down by treatment, 22% of partici-
pants in the under treatment and 31% of participants in the over treatment chose a 
tariff that did not match their optimal choice given their stated estimated clicks. We 
did not observe any systematic differences in terms of the chosen tariff, as the non-
consistent choices comprised 52% pay-per-use and 48% flat-rate.
In line with previous research, this result suggests that at least some of these par-
ticipants had a preference for a specific tariff and therefore deliberately chose the 
more expensive tariff.10 Consistent with this argument, results of a Mann–Whit-
ney-U test indeed showed that participants with non-consistent choices scored 
higher on the scales for tariff-specific preferences than participants with a con-
sistent choice (using an index of tariff-specific preferences11:  Mconsistent = 13.19, 
 Mnot consistent = 14.16,  zMann–Whitney-U = 2.34, p = .019).
Regression To control for additional drivers of tariff choice, we ran a logistic 
regression model with overconfidence (0 = underconfidence; 1 = overconfidence), 
attitude towards risk (7-point scale; 1 = “completely unwilling to take risks” – 7 = 
“completely willing to take risks”), an index of tariff-specific preferences, age, sex 
(0 = female; 1 = male), and income (categorical, “up to $1000” as baseline cat-
egory) as the independent variables, and choice (0 = pay-per-use; 1 = flat-rate) as 
the dependent variable.
As Table 2 shows, the results corroborate that overconfidence has a significant 
effect on tariff choice, even when controlling for tariff-specific preferences and 
demographics (model 1). Thus, overconfident participants were more likely to 
choose the pay-per-use option. Moreover, we replicate previous research by dem-
onstrating that the higher the index for tariff-specific preferences, the more likely 
participants were to choose the flat-rate option. These results also hold when includ-
ing a measure of risk preferences, although the effect of overconfidence is then only 
marginally significant (p = .055, model 2). In line with previous research, risk-seek-
ing participants were also more likely to choose the pay-per-use option and risk-
averse participants were more likely to choose the flat-rate option (Lambrecht and 
Skiera 2006; Grubb 2009).
10 Although we provide some evidence that these participants were having a preference for the more 
expensive tariff, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that they simply did not understand the rules 
of the game. However, since participants qualified to participate in the study by correctly answering com-
prehension questions, we are confident that this was not the case.
11 Since the tariff-specific preferences (insurance effect, taximeter effect, and convenience effect) accord-
ing to Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) were highly correlated, we included an index of the three effects in 
the regressions, calculated as the sum of the scores of the three effects. Cronbach’s α of the individual 
scales are: insurance effect (α = 0.84), taximeter effect (α = 0.86), and convenience effect (α = 0.81).
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Mediation analysis We conducted a mediation analysis (Hayes 2013; Model 4) 
to provide further evidence for our proposed psychological process. We used over-
confidence (i.e., the treatment) as the independent variable (0 = underconfidence; 
1 = overconfidence), estimated usage as the mediator, and tariff choice as the 
dependent variable (0 = pay-per-use; 1 = flat-rate). As Fig. 4 shows, the results sup-
port the hypothesized model: overconfidence had a significant negative effect on 
estimated usage (b = − 2.74; SE = .94; p = .004). Estimated usage had in turn a sig-
nificant positive effect on tariff choice (b = .07; SE = .02; p < .001). Importantly, in 
support of our prediction, the overall indirect effect was significant, thus estimated 
usage significantly mediated the effect of overconfidence on tariff choice (b = − .19; 
95% CI [− .39, − .07]). Thus, overconfident participants underestimated their usage 
and were relatively more likely to choose the pay-per-use option. The opposite effect 
Table 2  Logistic regression analysis
Standard errors in parentheses
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < 0.1
a Baseline category: “up to $1000”
Tariff choice: Model 1 Model 2
0 = pay-per-use
1 = flat-rate
Treatment dummy (0 = under; 
1 = over)
− 0.477** (0.214) − 0.432* (0.221)
Attitude towards risk − 0.315*** (0.069)
Tariff preferences index 0.171*** (0.033) 0.185*** (0.034)
Age − 0.3 × 10−3 (0.010) − 0.4 × 10−2 (0.010)
Sex 0.191 (0.216) 0.397* (0.227)
Incomea
$1001–$2000 − 0.569 (0.408) − 0.595 (0.419)
$2001–$3000 0.158 (0.384) 0.208 (0.390)
$3001 or above 0.205 (0.358) 0.259 (0.362)









b = -.19, 95% CI [-.39, -.07]
b = -.27, 95% CI [-.68, .14]
Fig. 4  Mediation analysis
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holds for underconfident participants. The direct effect of overconfidence on tariff 
choice was not significant (b = − .27; 95% CI [− .68, .14]).
5  Discussion and conclusion
This paper examines the effects of overconfidence on tariff choice using an experi-
mental approach. The results suggest that overconfidence leads to an underestima-
tion of usage and as a result to a relative increase in the choice of a pay-per-use 
(vs. flat-rate) option. We observe the opposite effect for underconfident participants. 
These findings support many studies in both marketing and economics that pro-
posed overconfidence as a key driver of tariff choice (e.g., DellaVigna and Mal-
mendier 2006; Grubb 2009, 2015a; Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). We extend this 
prior research by establishing a causal relationship between overconfidence and 
tariff choice, and by proposing and analyzing a psychological process behind this 
relationship.
5.1  Theoretical implications
The central goal of many studies in various disciplines is to elucidate cause-effect 
relationships between variables. Prior research has successfully established an asso-
ciation (or correlation) between overconfidence and tariff-choice decisions from 
observational or survey data, but this is only a necessary not a sufficient condition 
for causal conclusions. For example, this identified relationship does not ensure that 
the variation in the independent variable came before the variation in the dependent 
variable nor does it rule out the possibility that the relationship is in fact spurious. 
Knowing what causes what is of crucial interest for researchers and managers alike. 
One of the most valuable methods to show causal relationships are experiments. To 
establish causal relationships it is crucial to have exogenous variation in variables 
that would otherwise be endogenous or confounded because of behavior, omitted 
variables, or selection effects (Reiss 2011). We provide such causal evidence for the 
relationship between overconfidence and tariff-choice decisions. Thereby, we aug-
ment prior research that has documented correlational relationships.
In the present research, we developed an incentive-compatible experiment in 
which participants were randomly assigned to one of two treatments inducing 
underconfidence and overconfidence respectively. Whereas multiple prior studies 
model overconfidence (e.g., Grubb 2009, 2015a) or rely on measurements of over-
confidence (e.g., Glaser and Weber 2007; Ren and Croson 2013), we successfully 
manipulate participants’ overconfidence. Moreover, the experimental economics 
literature suggests that salient, incentive-aligned monetary consequences will result 
in stronger out-of-sample predictive performance of actual behaviors and provide 
better estimates of consumer preference structures than hypothetical studies (e.g., 
Ding et al. 2005). By introducing our novel experimental paradigm, other research-
ers interested in tariff choice and overconfidence can now build on it.
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5.2  Managerial implications
Understanding drivers of tariff choice is essential for firms, as tariff choice and tar-
iff characteristics can determine the satisfaction and thereby retention of custom-
ers (Becker et al. 2015). If customers are not satisfied with service quality, they are 
more likely to churn, which can be costly and threatening to the viability of busi-
ness models and thus the survival of firms. Accordingly, our data also shows that 
participants who did not choose the optimal tariff (i.e., committed a flat-rate or pay-
per-use error) were less satisfied with their choice  (Mno error = 6.31,  Merror = 4.93, 
 zMann–Whitney-U = 6.80, p < .001). However, we also look at the extent to which incor-
rectly choosing the pay-per-use option and incorrectly choosing the flat-rate option 
affects satisfaction. Interestingly, participants who committed a flat-rate error are 
more satisfied with their “error” than participants who committed a pay-per-use 
error  (Mflat-rate error = 5.49,  Mpay-per-use error = 4.16,  zMann–Whitney-U = − 2.90, p < .01). In 
summary, participants who made the correct tariff choice are more satisfied than 
participants who did not choose the optimal tariff. Among the participants who 
committed a tariff-choice error, however, those who made a flat-rate error are more 
satisfied with their choice than those who made a pay-per-use error.
When analyzing their customers’ alleged tariff-choice errors, it is important for 
managers to identify its causes—tariff-specific preferences and/or behavioral biases. 
Depending on the cause, different managerial actions seem appropriate. Customers 
need not be dissatisfied with tariff-choice errors, if they have tariff-specific prefer-
ences. In these cases, managers can focus on measures like tariff structure optimi-
zation or cross-selling and upselling. By contrast, if tariff-choice errors are caused 
by biased beliefs, customers may be dissatisfied and eventually churn. Firms can 
address their customers’ biased beliefs in two ways.
First, firms may exploit tariff-choice errors caused by behavioral biases of their cus-
tomers for profit-maximizing purposes. For example, firms could design and commu-
nicate their tariffs and pricing in such a way that customers systematically choose a 
more expensive tariff than necessary. This may entail highlighting the unlimited usage 
of an expensive flat-rate tariff to exploit consumers’ exaggerated usage estimations or 
increasing product uncertainty with the use of flexible products (e.g., Mang et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, firms could decide to only selectively inform their customers who make 
tariff-choice errors. For example, based on our results, firms could decide to inform 
only those customers that they would be better off in another tariff who are least satis-
fied with their tariff choice, in our case those who have made a pay-per-use error.
Second, managers may want to target customers with debiasing measures to 
improve satisfaction, which we outline next. With respect to tariff-choice errors due 
to overconfidence, firms could try to reduce the overconfidence of their customers 
by offering them decision aids to better estimate their usage, or by proactively offer-
ing them the cost-minimizing tariff to invest in their satisfaction and thus in a long-
term relationship. One example of a firm that informs its customers about potentially 
avoidable costs is the streaming provider Netflix, which has recently started to can-
cel subscriptions of inactive customers.12
12 https ://techc runch .com/2020/05/21/netfl ix-to-start -cance lling -inact ive-accou nts/.
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In a similar way, service providers could disclose more information on average 
monthly bills across all existing customers or make information about a customer’s 
own past usage levels more salient to reduce misforecasting and potentially overcon-
fidence. A potential motivation for such practices on the part of firms is that it can 
lead to greater customer loyalty and associated behavior (e.g., longer contract dura-
tions, cross-selling and upselling, positive word of mouth). But policy makers could 
even impose such measures on firms.
Our experimental approach to study the effect of overconfidence on tariff choice 
also has important implications for managers in terms of effective budget allocation. 
For example, developing and implementing decision aids for consumers as described 
above is a costly endeavor for a firm. Yet, in the absence of causal evidence, a firm 
cannot be sufficiently certain that such decision aids and the corresponding invest-
ments will be effective and thus justified. As outlined before, Grubb and Osborne 
(2015) examine the effectiveness of alerts that customers receive when they sur-
pass their allowance. The authors demonstrate that such alerts are only effective if 
consumers are in fact overconfident. In the absence of overconfidence, sending out 
alerts would have no effect and managers would have spent scarce resources on inef-
fective interventions.
Our results are particularly informative for managers in service contexts that have 
utilitarian characteristics and in which usage estimations are common. In these set-
tings, overconfidence is likely to influence tariff-choice decisions. Examples include 
subscription services in the domain of consumer products (e.g., razor blades, black 
socks, etc.), mobility services (e.g., car sharing, ride sharing), and novel utility ser-
vices (e.g., electric vehicle charging).
Finally, while our study focuses on tariff-choice situations, the experimental 
design and results can also be extended to an employment context. Especially with 
the increasing presence and importance of so-called “gig economy” jobs, people can 
now more often and more flexibly choose between a “pay-per-use” (e.g., a gig econ-
omy job on Upwork) and a “flat-rate” job (i.e., fixed contract). Thereby, this paper 
also relates to studies analyzing the influence of biased beliefs on (employment) 
contract choices (e.g., Hoffman and Burks 2020; Spinnewijn 2015; Kőszegi 2014).
For example, Hoffman and Burks (2020) find that worker overconfidence may be 
important for optimal job design and compensation. As a result, overconfident work-
ers might opt for the piece rate (i.e., pay-per-use) instead of the flat income, since 
they estimate that they will earn more under the piece rate. Similarly, our above 
results on satisfaction can also be extended to an employment context, since unsat-
isfied employees are more likely to quit, increasing firms’ turnover cost. Thereby, 
for a long-term perspective, optimal job and compensation design should also take 
employee satisfaction into account.
5.3  Limitations and future research
We acknowledge some limitations of our research that provide avenues for future 
work. The first limitation relates to the external validity of our experiment, espe-
cially the sequence of tasks. In real markets, people are heterogeneous with regard to 
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overconfidence, which may affect their tariff-choice decisions. Thus, overconfidence 
may drive tariff-choice decisions without a preceding addition or number sequence 
task. Nevertheless, other activities or decisions prior to a tariff-choice decision might 
also be able to trigger comparable effects on consumers’ tariff-choice behavior. The 
important question is whether they induce overconfidence or underconfidence and 
whether, as a result, consumers will form biased beliefs regarding their expected con-
sumption. It would be interesting to investigate whether real-life situations (e.g., exam/
job success or failure) shift overconfidence and influence tariff-choice decisions in pre-
dictable ways.
Another aspect related to the external validity of our study concerns the experi-
mental implementation of the tariffs. Specifically, we paid participants a bonus that 
was reduced dependent on their chosen tariff and their behavior (pay-per-use option 
only) under their chosen tariff. However, in the case of gym and mobile phone 
contracts, for example, consumers usually have to pay a certain amount for each 
unit consumed, rather than having to make a large upfront payment, which is then 
reduced. Yet, there are also pay-per-use types in which an upfront fee needs to be 
paid—like in the case of a book of ten tickets used in gyms (e.g., as in DellaVigna 
and Malmendier 2006) or public transportation. Given that our design choice ena-
bled us to make participants’ behavior in the experiment consequential and that such 
pay-per-use types exist in the field, we opted for the described experimental imple-
mentation. However, future research should explore the impact of alternative ways 
of modeling the benefit of a contract.
Several studies have shown that biases may diminish over time through learning 
(e.g., Grubb and Osborne 2015; Miravete 2002). Because we analyze a single tariff-
choice decision, we cannot observe the long-term effects of overconfidence on tariff 
choice. We leave the analysis of these effects to future research.
In addition, future research could explore whether the effects hold in particular 
contexts (e.g., car sharing) and whether context-specific differences exist. As we 
conducted our experiment in a rather controlled online environment, further research 
in the field would be interesting.
Finally, potential moderators of the effect of overconfidence on tariff choice seem 
worth exploring. Specifically, it is an open question whether and to what extent 
the effects of overconfidence on tariff choice are moderated through experience 
or specific contexts. In this regard, it might also be interesting to consider varying 
the stakes. All else being equal, higher stakes should induce people to invest more 
cognitive effort, which in turn should result in less biased decisions. Furthermore, 
time pressure could be a moderator in tariff-choice decisions because this decision 
impairment may attenuate or amplify the effect of overconfidence on tariff choice. 
Eventually, overconfidence is typically correlated with risk preferences. One pos-
sible way to examine risk preferences as a moderator of the effect of overconfidence 
on tariff choice is to experimentally manipulate whether decision makers choose a 
tariff for themselves or for someone else. Prior research found that when an indi-
vidual makes a decision for an anonymous third party, there is a tendency to exhibit 
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less risk aversion (Chakravarty et al. 2011). This reduction in risk aversion is rela-
tive to the participants’ own preferences, and it is also relative to their beliefs about 
the preferences of others. Thus, manipulating whether people are choosing a tariff 
for themselves vs. for a third party should also influence their risk preferences and 
thus enable researchers to explore risk preferences as a moderator of the effect of 
overconfidence on tariff choice.
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Appendix
Table 3 depicts the manipulation of overconfidence, Fig. 5 shows the usage task, 
Fig. 6 depicts the tariff-choice options, and Table 4 contains the scales and items 
used in the experiment.In a memory game you need to match pairs of tiles.
Table 3  Manipulation of overconfidence
Treatment Underconfidence Overconfidence
Instructions Please provide the number or letter  
that logically follows next  
in the series of numbers or letters
Please provide the answer 
to the additions
Question 1 8, 2, 6, 4, 7, 3, 5, ? 29 + 55 =
Question 2 7, 7, 15, 21, 37, 57, ? 71 + 15 =
Question 3 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 15, ? 31 + 63 =
Question 4 1, 3, 5, 11, 21, 43, ? 13 + 51 =
Question 5 a, d, h, m, ? 47 + 44 =
Question 6 2, 4, 6, 10, 16, ? 60 + 39 =
Question 7 11 + 40 =
Question 8 43 + 14 =
Question 9 35 + 40 =
Question 10 32 + 23 =
Question 11 40 + 7 =
Question 12 50 + 11 =
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You turn over one tile and then try to find a matching tile. You are going to solve 
the memory game below (in a different order), for which you can receive a bonus 
payment
Fig. 5  Usage task
Fig. 6  Tariff-choice options
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